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            Arba’een Square, Suez, Egypt. November 2012  
 
          “Oh Suez…my homeland…I shall die so you live on… 
Oh Suez…, Oh Suez… 
Oh my friends let’s go…If our lives and homeland are at risk, we’ll fight for them 
and come back to our town… 
For you my hometown…which has always resisted… 
For you I’d die, and others would too… 
To save my land and my people…“ 
Egyptian poem1 from an unknown writer. 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Sherif Salah, ‘’Suez : Cradle of Revolt’’, 17 January, 2012, Al-Jazeera, accessed on 6 June, 2014, 
http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/revolutionthrougharabeyes/2011/12/20111229132934234283.html	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Introduction 
 
 
 
“Very few people know it in the West, but in Egypt it is very known: Suez had the 
reputation of resistance against Egypt’s enemies. We wanted to show, and we still want to 
show, that Suez also has the reputation of resistance against dictatorship“2. 
Suez is a seaport city which is one of the two gates of the Suez Canal. Most media 
talked about Tahrir Square in Cairo as the epicenter of the Arab Spring in Egypt. However 
the truth is that Suez was genuinely the center of the unprecendented uprising, as it was the 
first city to rise up against Mubarak. Likewise, Suez was also sadly known for being the city 
where the first protester was killed in Egypt during the January 2011 uprisings. Therein, 
Suez was renowned across Egypt for carrying ‘The Flame of Revolution‘. As such, some 
activists referred to Suez as the ‘Egyptian Sidi Bouzid’3.  
As a result, after a first day-trip in the city in November 2012, I decided to delve the 
reasons that led people to rise up much more fiercely than in the other cities in the area. 
A scrutiny regarding Suez compels to pay attenton to Suez’s location. As a matter of 
fact, the location is peculiar and strategic as this seaport city is located at the southern 
entrance of the Suez Canal. Therefore, the city gathers large factories and commercial 
activities. This led to labor organizing and activism. In other words, such a ground is like a 
vulcano as regards the social order protest. 
Furthermore, history is a very helpful tool to provide a greater comprehension of 
what is really at stake in the city. Indeed, Suez’s recent history enables to understand the 
local population’s frustration that entailed what is called a culture of resistance through the 
past decades. 
The aforestated frustration that gradually turned into violence and protest was largely 
due to corruption, and especially cronyism under President Hosni Mubarak. As a matter of 
fact, the latter used to appoint his cronies to run companies in this key area. Worse, 
Mubarak’s cronies accustomed to hiring people from their home governorates instead of 
natives of Suez. Doing so, they fed unemployment and discontent by their discrimination 
policy, and irresistibly boosted social tenuousness. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Interview 1 of a 37-years old Egyptian man at el-Ataba, Cairo. 3 September 2014. 
3 In reference to the Tunisian town where Mohamed Bouazizi triggered off the –alleged- Arab Spring by 
setting himself on fire in protest. 
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Above all that, the police forces were guilty of scandalous abuses in the city. For 
instance, they committed shameful acts as racketeering, barely concealed bribery, and even 
torture. In short, in 2011, a war was declared on the police by the residents of Suez who felt 
hopeless. This war seems to be still ongoing, despite the political turmoils and changes. 
Therein, Suez is definitely a place that deserves to be scrutinized. 
As said above, history is a great –essential- tool to understand what is underway in 
Suez. Suez started to gain a bright reputation thereafter the 1956 War, against France, the 
United Kingdom and Israel, for their heroic and renowned resistance. Subsequently, just 
after the 1967 Six-Day War, the Suez’s inhabitants faced a terrible humiliation by being 
expelled from their homes. Meanwhile, some of them decided to stay in the city in order to 
resist. So did they by gathering into militias. 
The 1973 Yom Kippour War plays a tremendous role into the city’s history, as 
people of Suez brought the only genuine victory to Egypt against the Zionist army. 
Factually, Suezi people were compelled to cope with a very harsh siege led by the Israeli 
Defense Forces (IDF). Indeed, capturing Suez meant controlling the road to Cairo. 
Therefore, the israeli forces tried as much as they could to asphyxiate the city and thereby 
compel its remaining residents4 to surrender and seize this strategic crossing point. Yet, 
despite the lack of everything (freshwater, food, supplies, ammunitions, fuel and electricity), 
destructions and casualties, the very few number of fighters succeeded to dash out the IDF. 
Doing so, they confirmed an already-existing prestige across the whole nation. A prestige 
that may be embodied by the statement: “Suez always resists for Egypt’s sake“5 
However, in spite of all its prestige after 1973, the city was overwhelmingly 
neglected by Cairo. Indeed, a deep and collective feeling of ungratefulness grew up in the 
city, due to its famous role in the two main wars against Israel. The misery grew up 
significantly, which fed a collective feeling of inward anger and disgust. In other words, the 
Suezi people fought for their country’s freedom. At that time, everyone around Egypt 
applauded the courage they showed. But now, Suezi people must have thought ‘All this for 
that?‘. Such a burgeoning feeling may appear as an open-door to tremendous actions of 
protest and violence. For a better understanding of all the aforementioned matter, it seems 
relevant to use an inductive approach. Indeed, many materials and aspects of the matter lead 
to think that Suez has a proper culture of resistance. Throughout this thesis, I will aim to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I say remaining residents because Israel compelled six years earlier most of the Suez canal cities’ inhabitants 
(i.e. including Suez) to leave their homes after the 1967 Six-Day War. 
5 Interview 2 of a 61-years old Egyptian man at Shubra el-Khaymah, Cairo. 5 September 2014. 
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analyse and explain all the different sources and clues which may lead to believe there is as 
such a social phenomenon in Suez. It seems to be relevant to use a grounded theory to the 
analysis of of data and to the generation of theory6. Doing so, I intend to explore the matter 
through various fields such as geopolitics, history, geography, sociology and economics. 
Indeed, I believe that it provides insightful empirical generalizations with little theory. 
Afterwards, I shall draw a conclusion from that reality through a main hypothesis that aims 
to go further within the analysis.  
Actually, a worthwhile analysis implies a comparison based on theory (from authors 
who theorized essential themes for my work such as ‘resistance‘, ‘culture‘, and ‘social 
revolution‘) and facts (that mostly concern Egypt). This approach appears to be the most 
relevant combination for a critical and impartial approach as regards Suez. Eventually, the 
project will dedicate a significant part to the analysis of theory, and then historical events. 
Verily, one cannot understand the specificity of this particular city, that is to say the core of 
my work, without putting forward theoretical concepts. These concepts are quite overriding 
for my scrutiny. The peculiar history of Suez must be explored because this leads to think 
that it gave birth to its current singularity.  
Thereby, many reasons lead to believe there is a culture of resistance specific to 
Suez. If so, was there a reversal from a nationalist culture of resistance to a social culture of 
resistance? The main hypothesis of my analysis is largely linked to history. Actually, it is 
based on the assumption that Suez’s local population was animated by a strong nationalist 
sentiment for decades. Thus they were pushed to resist fiercely against foreign invasions. 
For instance, during the Tripartite Aggression in 1956 or during the 1967 and 1973 wars. 
But now, with its high prestige amid the Egyptian population, Suez literally feels the duty to 
be at the forefront of the protest against the Government in Cairo. Indeed, there is no more 
foreign enemy per se since 19797, and people focus more on their own condition. Doing so, 
they feel the need to rise up to denounce the great social precariousness. Suezi people 
sparked off a thrust which spread all over the country. Even though, their anger is both 
motivated and based on their own condition, somehow this is a protest that aims to castigate 
the terrible living conditions of the whole society. Through this, I intend to show that the 
culture of resistance in Suez must be understood as a national social culture of resistance. 
Indeed, Suez has always been very concerned by Egypt’s future. It is not an ‘island‘ 
politically disconnected of the country. Instead, it seems to be a city culturally specific due 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Bryman, Alan, Social Research methods, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 27  
7 Year of the peace agreement between Egypt and Israel. 
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to its inclination to rise up and resist for the sake of the country. Therein, compared to other 
Egyptian cities, Suez must be known for its idiosyncrasy regarding resistance. 
Eventually, it must be necessary to elaborate analyses on the observed and studied 
findings concerning the past and the current situation in Suez. Therefore, a short overview of 
ongoing processes will be done. As such, a great attention will be paid to the expected 
effects of the construction of the Second Suez Canal, especially as regards the social 
improvement of  Suez’s residents. This shall lead to scrutinize what the perception of the 
Suezi people vis-à-vis el-Sisi’s regime is, but also how the very first demonstrators of the 
2011 uprisings accepted the kind of a start-over pertaining the revolution. All through this 
chapter, I shall attempt to explain how el-Sisi feels so greatly concerned regarding the social 
situation in the area. Moreover, Suez appears as a national challenge on this matter due to its 
geopolitical importance.  
As a matter of fact, el-Sisi wants to deal with two matters at a time through this 
enormous project. He wants to reassure countries that feel worry for their goods transitting 
by the Canal. Doing so, he wants to bring order back in the area to make sure that Egypt 
keeps on being able to preserve the cargoes’ safety. Meanwhile, he wants to thwart an 
alternative project, initiated by a hostile country and which aims to skirt the canal. Such a 
project, if it is carried out, would be a disaster for the Egyptian economy and would boost 
the social precariousness. By bringing order back in the area and by launching such a bold 
project, President el-Sisi wants to confirm Egypt’s monopoly on the international waterways 
in the region. He could do so both by bringing order back in Suez by granting jobs and by 
force, if needed. 
All in all, after exploring what is the theory and the most appropriate terms to tackle 
in order to discuss the culture of resistance in Suez, I will shed light on the recent history of 
the city. Through this part, I shall enlight how the city gained such a reputation. Eventually, 
I will put forward the unfolding of the 2011 uprisings and what is still underway in the 
renowned Red Sea’s seaport city. In order to carry out a full and varied research, I used 
several materials. For example, I worked with newspaper articles and scholars’ books, and 
also used documentaries as much as movies. For instance, I contacted an Egyptian director –
Ahmed Nour- who made a movie about his birthplace i.e. Suez. His movie’s name is Moug 
[‘Waves’]. It has been really helpful because he tried to describe the five waves of resistance 
in Suez. I used it both as a viewpoint and a testimony, as several Suezi people expressed 
themselves into the movie. And naturally, I also used the three interviews that I personnally 
conducted in Egypt during my two-weeks stay in early September 2014.   
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Literature review 
 
 
The topic combines specific aspects proper to the city of Suez.  A rather important 
part of theory due to the concepts elaborated throughout this scrutiny. Therefore through this 
literature review, I aim at comparing perspectives on the same phenomenon, on the same 
historical event, and on the same concept.  
In order to carry out a worthwhile literature review, I analyzed three books. 
Meanwhile, I used other books and a certain number of news articles that delve aspects of 
my topic. Two of them are books based on facts and analyses. The other is by far more 
theoretical. The first one’s title is Soldiers, Spies and Statesmen. Egypt’s Road to Revolt, 
written by Hazem Kandil. The second book is Lineages of Revolt. Issues of Contemporary 
Capitalism in the Middle East, written by Adam Hanieh. It was helpful to gather data and 
interpretations on the matter. And the last one, much more theoretical is Social Revolutions 
in the Modern World, written by Theda Skocpol. This book was very useful to understand 
the differences as regards social concepts that I will mention below. 
All three of these books helped me to elaborate a nuanced analysis concerning the 
topic of my thesis. Indeed, they provide clear and different visions about the social 
phenomenon at stake in Suez. Despite the global aspect of these books of great quality, they 
allow the researcher who works on Suez to clutch the great dynamics in the city known for 
its inclination for resistance.  
The books are far-reaching indeed, because there is a scale of magnitude difference 
in the study areas. A. Hanieh chose to study the impact of capitalism in all the Arab World, 
including Maghreb countries and Israel. But the comparison that he undertook was quite 
interesting. As a matter of fact, I could compare the social situations in peculiar areas with 
Suez. For instance, it was very interesting to read about the 2008 Gafsa revolt in Tunisia. 
The unemployed workers on temporary contracts, high school students and families of those 
who worked in the region’s phosphate mines walked out. All this entailed a fierce repression 
from the government8. It was relatively striking to compare Gafsa with Suez because, even 
though Gafsa is a mining town while Suez is a port, both cities embody a key-sector for their 
national economies. However, they both felt the need to rise up against precariousness. They 
even accuse the government to be responsible for their miserable social condition because 
their respective governments generate tremendous incomes thanks to these two places. This 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Hanieh, Adam, Lineages of Revolt. Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle East, (Chicago:   
Haymarket Books, 2013), 162 
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leads to understand that specific places are more likely to revolt if they bring a lot to the 
country. Unfortunately, they still live in shantytowns, due to corruption and, somehow, 
ungratefulness of the government.  
In the case of Suez, there is even superstitution from Mubarak as an explanation of 
precariousness. As a matter of fact, 30 years ago, a soothsayer reportedly looked at 
Mubarak’s eyes and told him “Your end will be in Suez!“9. Of course, it seems to be 
certainly a legend, but it must be taken into account because he neglected the city during all 
his ‘reign’. He never came to visit one of the most important ports of the country and the 
capital of one of the largest Egypt’s governorates10. While the previous Egyptian presidents 
–such as Nasser or Sadat11- all paid a lot of attention to the city. 
However, as both Hanieh and Kandil mention, going on strike does not mean being 
ready for the revolution, because significant protests occurred in Egypt between 2004 and 
2009. 1,900 had taken place involving 1,7 million workers in strike actions12. Kandil is even 
more accurate 13 : “ […] aggressive privatization and the government’s wholesale 
abandonment of the public sector triggered numerous labor strikes : 161 strikes in 2001, 86 
in 2003, the violent April 6 national strike of 2008, and more than 700 in 2010. In fact, 
between 2001 and 2011, perhaps 2 million workers participated in strikes“14. 
 One of the main disagreements between Hanieh and Skocpol is based on the Marxist 
approach. Hanieh dedicates a significant part to the Marxist approach so as to explain what 
happened in the Arab World in 2011, including in Egypt. Doing so, he wants to denounce 
the system of classes which is “always a social relation which is continually being made and 
remade in an ongoing process of accumulation“15. According to him, the history of the 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) is a “long-standing struggle between the 
‘authoritarian state’ and ‘economic and political liberalization“ with a direct correlation 
between economic performance and the degree of democracy16. In short, Hanieh considers 
that most of the burning issues in the Arab World, so Egypt included, are due to a new 
imperialism called liberalism. Thereby,  all these strikes should be interpreted as waves of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Nour, Ahmed, Moug [‘Waves’], Nour, Ahmed, 2012 
10  Boraie, Eihab, 30 January, 2014, “Waves : Suez’s untold revolution,“Cairo Scene, 
http://www.cairoscene.com/ViewArticle.aspx?AId=2357-Waves-Suez%27s-Untold-Revolution 
11 Kandil, Hazem, Soldiers, Spies, and Statesmen. Egypt’s Road to Revolt, (London: Verso, 2014), 105 
12 Ibid, 162 
13 Kandil 2014, p. 217 
14 Ghoneim, Azmat, “The Egyptian Intifada in Historical Perspective.“, Benin, 113-115 
15 Hanieh 2013, p.6 
16 Ibid, 5 
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convulsions before the storm, that is, the revolution. Besides, liberalism is also strongly 
criticised by Kandil. He denounces the fact that “Sadat made with the Americans, a deal to 
transform Egypt from a potentially ‘industrial state to a service state,’ a perpetually 
dependent market on foreign products and largesse“17.  
Furthermore, Kandil adds that this new Egyptian economy’s outline of produced 
“thousands of millionnaires in an overwhelmingly poor society“18. In addition, these 
millionnaires were not jobs creators but rather speculators such as “importers, 
moneychangers, and middlemen, as well as rehabilited ‘ancien regime’ landowners“19. In 
other words, this ‘new nomenklatura‘ constituted “a full-blown comprador bourgeoisie, or 
simply a mafia…the consequence is the same“20. All this transformation was part of an 
open-door economic policy called Infitah, implemented by Mubarak during the 1980s. It 
was in the same vein as his predecessor Sadat. That policy created this tiny privileged class, 
they did not take part neither in the industry nor the employment. The gap became larger 
significantly between the extreme privileged class and other segments of the Egyptian 
population, somewhat on the model of post-Soviet Russia. Indicatively, Kandil highlights at 
that time, 20 percent of the population owned 5 percent of the national income. Still worse, 
the share of the richest 10 percent was 33 percent; and that of the richest 20 percent was 
more than 50 percent of the national income21.  
All this to bring out there was a significant issue as regards the redistribution of 
wealth. They seems to agree on the explanation that it was overwhelmingly due to the 
economic policy of liberalization. This matter is quite central in this topic due to its impact 
in the region of Suez. As a matter of fact, Mubarak’s regime had had a time of long grace 
period because of the oil boom of the 1970s. Naturally, the oil boom entailed an increase of 
the country’s revenue from oil exports and from the increase of the traffic always denser in 
the Suez Canal. Indeed, “Over one third of the state revenue came from these sources, as 
opposed to less than 50% from taxes. (…) The Suez Canal administration chaneled in $1 
billion annually. However, oil prices plummeted from $36 a barrel in 1980 to $12 in 1986. 
The collapse was felt in Egypt in 1986 as exports were sliced in half from $2.26 billion to 
$1.2 billion, and Suez Canal tariffs dropped from $1 billion to less than $900 million“22. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 Kandil 2014, p. 161 
18 Ibid, 204 
19 Ibid 
20 Springborg, Robert, Mubarak’s Egypt : fragmentation of the political order, (Westview Press, 1989), 87  
21 Kandil 2014, p. 204 
22 Ibid 
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Kandil asserts that liberalization made Egypt dependent on the stock market and a prey of 
choice for speculators. Whereas Skocpol asserts that “All states have grown up in given 
geopolitical and world-economic contexts“23.  
Skocpol allows another approach of the revolution per se. Actually, her arguments 
about revolutions from above and below induces a modification, nay a repudiation, of 
classical Marxist arguments about modes of production and class conflicts in revolutions. 
Therein Skocpol is opposed to Hanieh and even, in some respects, Kandil (albeit more 
moderate). In fact, she shares Weber’s ideas concerning historical political sociology, that is, 
she argues for “the explanatory relevance of bureaucratization, degrees of state 
centralization, and patterns of institutionalized political relationships between dominant 
classes and monarchs and their staffs“24. This approach is overlooks by Hanieh, which 
seems plenty rocked by Nasserian romance, happy to quote an excerpt from Nasser’s work 
about revolutions Falsafat al-Thawrah ("Philosophy of the Revolution"). While precisely 
Skocpol advocates for a structuralism that “deromanticized -and to some degree 
devillainized- revolutions“25. Thereby, she calls for a cold and pragmatic analyzis of a social 
phenomenon. Skocpol provides a significant enlightenment to this topic which is focused on 
the culture of resistance in the city of Suez. As Sewell, she deems a culture as “constitutive 
of social order“26. As such, her assessment is that in each social revolution, a new system of 
culture suddenly replaces an old one. She even goes further by asserting that “multiple 
‘cultural idioms’ always coexist in societies and in revolutionary situations“27. This is very 
helpful to forge a comprehensive backbone of a research about what the feeling shared by 
Suez’s inhabitants is as regards resistance.  
Besides, the first chapter of this thesis aims at delving concepts as ‘culture‘, 
‘resistance‘ and what is exactly a ‘culture of resistance‘. Furthermore, Skocpol adds that 
“ideologies are forged –and constantly reworked- by groups engaged in political conflicts 
over state-building and social change. No one cultural system will ever give (…) ‘the key’ to 
the processes and outcomes of revolutionary conflicts“28. It is actually a key aspect of my 
research in the extent that I must deal with the specificities of the region, of Egypt and of the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Skocpol, Theda, Social Revolutions in the Modern World, (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 8 
24 Ibid, 11 
25 Ibid, 9 
26 Ibid, 14 
27 Ibid, 15 
28 Ibid. 
	   12	  
city of Suez. In fact, there is not a single pattern to explain, or rather to emulate, Suez’s 
culture of resistance on another.  
Nevertheless, some social-theorists made interesting researches quite worthwhile to 
carry out a scrutiny about commonalities. Despite the myriad of areas explored by Skocpol, 
she conveys a relevant idea through a pretty good argument in suggesting that “a truly 
comparative-historical analysis of the role of cultural idioms and ideological movements in 
revolutions would encourage to discover and explain variations across modern social 
revolutions, as well as similarities“29. The argument is relevant concerning Suez. As a matter 
of fact, a social movement of protest occurred in the city. Subsequently religious movements 
(salafī movements and the Muslim Brotherhood) and leftist organizations fed the protest so 
that to keep on resisting.  
However, Skocpol underscores an aspect about social revolutions which is not very 
obvious for a researcher and that may be useful for a worthwhile study. She asserts that 
within a state-centered framework, basically, the most fertile ground, in revolutionary state-
building, is the capacity of a morally confident leadership to create coercive organizations 
and to mobilize popular support through militias, committees of surveillance and the like. 
Yet, “socioeconomic conditions cannot explain where revolutionary movements have gained 
strong followings“30. Therein she opposes frontally Kandil and Hanieh that explain a large 
part of the 2011 protest movements by socioeconomic data. Although Hanieh qualifies his 
remarks at the very end of his book by saying “As this book has emphasized, imperialism, 
the nature of neoliberal transformation, and the pervasiveness of autocracy are all internally 
related aspects of capitalism in the Middle East. All these aspects shaped the form that the 
2008 financial crisis took and its specific ramifications for the region. Seen from this 
perspective, the roots of the 2011 uprisings are certainly not be found in a single factor (such 
as authoritarianism, poverty, food prices, unemployment, and so forth) but, just as 
importantly, the roots are ‘multicausal’“31. This statement is paramount because it compels 
the researcher to be cautious about the uprising’s roots explanations– at a lower scale- in a 
city such as Suez.  
Kandil denounces mightily Mubarak’s mismanagement concerning the Egyptian 
economy and puts forward the crucial problem of corruption (unlike Hanieh, at least not 
enough) in mentioning, for instance, the great scandal of corruption in the Gulf of Suez 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 Ibid 
30 Ibid, 19 
31 Hanieh 2013, p. 173 
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involving one of the lieutenants of the Mubarak regime: Ahmed Ezz32. My assessment is 
that corruption is one of the most tremendous Egypt’s problems. Thereby, the population of 
Suez may have been fed up by so much bribery and cronyism, accompanied by the 
government, in an environment where social despair is ubiquitous 33 . As he rightly 
summarizes, under Mubarak, “Egypt had become a failed state in the eyes of its own people 
[where] corruption had become a way of life“34. 
Another aspect tackled by Kandil seems to be taken into account, that is, Islamist 
movements. Even though it is depicted on the national scale, it certainly concerns Suez since 
the city became one of the ‘neats’ of the salafīs and Islamist movements after the 2011 
uprising35. Kandil asserts that “the Muslim Brotherhood is the alter ego of the old regime“36. 
While their strength seemed to be, on the contrary, the main political force against the 
Mubarak regime. Yet, Skocpol seems more lukewarm than Kandil about this complex aspect 
of social revolutions, especially when she mentions the Iranian revolution’s case. She makes 
a statement that is applicable to the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt by saying “social 
revolutions have not been caused by avowedly revolutionary movements in which an 
ideological leadership mobilizes mass support to overthrow an existing system in the name 
of a new alternative. Avowedly revolutionary leaderships have often been absent or 
politically marginal until after the collapse of prerevolutionary regimes. And popular groups 
[…] have contributed to revolutionary transformations by revolting for concrete ideals and 
goals separate from those espoused by the revolutionary leaderships that end up 
consolidating revolutions by building up new state organizations“37. That is indeed exactly 
what happened in Egypt, and in turn, in Suez. As a matter of fact, since Nasser, the Muslim 
Brotherhood were either imprisoned (let us mention inter alia the renowed case of Sayyid 
Qutb38) or working clandestinely for the fringe of the poorer population through clientelistic 
social initiatives characters. They were doing so, through a dense network of charitable 
institutions. As Hanieh mentions throughout his part called ‘The Muslim Brotherhood and 
the Counterrevolution’: “One attempted solution to this challenge of restoring the old 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 I shall explain more in details this scandal in the second chapter. 
33 Kandil 2014, p. 215 
34 Ibid, 218 
35 Pradal, François,  “Plongée dans l’Egypte rebelle : Suez entre salafisme et révolution.“ Le Monde 
diplomatique, 31 January 2012, http://www.monde-diplomatique.fr/2012/01/PRADAL/47160 
36 Ibid, 253 
37 Skocpol 1994, p. 241 
38 Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) is a renowned intellectual Egyptian figure. He was a member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood during the 1950s. In 1966, he was sentenced to death after being convicted of plotting the 
assassination of President Nasser. 
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patterns of rule focused upon parties coming out the tradition of political Islam, most 
notably the once-outlawed Muslim Brotherhood. Much like Mubarak’s NDP, the 
organization had a deep penetration across the country, including in rural areas, and was 
thereby able to play an important ideological and mobilizational role. It had taken a 
pernicious position in the February and September 2011 strike waves, repeatedly acting to 
undermine independent workers’ actions and demobilize movements on the streets“39. In 
short, as Napoleon Bonaparte said “In the revolutions, there are two kinds of people: those 
who make them and those who benefit“.  The Muslim Brotherhood clearly took advantage 
of the mass popular protest by trying to get the laurels of the revolution, despite the limited 
role they played40. By doing so, they initiated a certain slide into what Kandil calls 
“religious fascism“41. They succeeded to achieve this political goal, in spite of the early 
warnings of representatives of independent workers’ organizations in more than forty 
factories and workplaces. It is not so surprising from workers’ representatives because they 
are known for being ideologically close to leftist movements42. They noted the “strikes, 
occupations, and demonstrations by hundreds of thousands of workers across Egypt [is the 
evidence of the] social aspect of this revolution and [we want] to prevent the revolution 
being taken away from those at its base who should be its beneficiaries“43. One of their main 
demands was the dissolution of the Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) as “one of the 
most important symbols of corruption under the defunct regime“44 which is the evidence that 
corruption must be one of the key aspects of this research work. 
 In short, all these books are good materials to rely on in order to understand how the 
Islamist movements succeeded to combine the social demand of the workers in Suez within 
an Islamic framework. Nevertheless, more Islam was not the top priority amongst the 
demands for the demonstrators. Instead, they wanted a reform of the minimum (and 
maximum) wage, job security, renationalization of privatized companies, and the right to 
take industrial action45. All these books, Hanieh’s, Kandil’s and Skocpol’s, emphasize one 
common thing which is applicable to Suez: the religious movements, whether the Salafīs or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 Hanieh 2013, p. 169 
40 Even though, some authors such as Marc Lynch testifies that “Muslim Brotherhood had played a key role in 
holding Tahrir and keeping the protests alive (…).“ (Lynch, Marc, The Arab Uprising. The Unfinished 
Revolutions of the Middle East, (New York : Public Affairs, 2012), 152). 
41 Kandil 2014, p. 263 
42 I noticed this reality through my researches (news articles) and the interviews that I conducted in Egypt. 
43 Hanieh, Adam, Lineages of Revolt. Issues of Contemporary Capitalism in the Middle East, (Chicago :   
Haymarket Books, 2013), 168 
44 Ibid 
45 Ibid 
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the Muslim Brotherhood, capitalized on the social tenuousness to get a political weight. As 
regards the Muslim Brotherhood, they got out from the cold after being persecuted for 
decades, but as Kandil reminds “[the Islamists] are not fundamentally opposed to 
authoritarianism, as long as they are not its victims46“. All along this scrutiny, I shall make 
sure to clearly distinguish the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafīs. This is paramount to do 
so because the two religious movements did not adopt the same policy stance. They are not 
perceived by the civilian population in the same way, they have clear different roots and 
they are not backed up by the same foreign actors. I shall depen this matter through the third 
chapter. 
Eventually, a final aspect needs to be explored i.e. the different perceptions of the 
Egyptian army. Popular belief would like to present the army as an institution with full 
powers, using a corruption and the industry at its disposal to impose its view over the 
country. This belief is overwhelmingly shared by Hanieh47 who depicts the institution of the 
army as the keeper of the capitalist interests. Above all when he says that “In Egypt [and 
Tunisia], the potential overthrow of regime figureheads […]presented the military and 
capitalist class with the challenge of taking charge of the transition, as opposing the 
movement might lead to its deepening radicalization. For this reason, the military in both 
cases essentially deserted the autocrats, attempting to steer the direction of transition in a 
manner that would ensure the continued stability of capitalist relations“48. In other words, 
according to Hanieh, the army chose to foster an Islamist movement, unlikely to spread 
chaos through the country, at the expense of political parties with political programs listed 
on the left, that is, eager to really work for the social question but not having to maintain 
order in their priorities. These parties were, for instance, the National Salvation Front (NSF), 
Mohamed ElBaradei (a displayed liberal alternative), Hamdeen Sabahi’s Nasserist political 
party al-Karama (Dignity), or the youth movement al-Tayar al Sha’bi (Popular Current), and 
they were all set aside by the army because the militaries consider they would put Egypt in a 
shambles49. Even though the 2011 uprising, in Suez and elsewhere across the country, 
showed that Egyptian people desperately demanded a social improvement not a 
reinforcement of Islam. On the contrary, Kandil really tries to turn down the aforementioned 
assumption about the army. He even called a subpart “The Myth of Military Privileges 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46 Kandil 2014, p. 240 
47 And also authors such as Marc Lynch (Lynch, Marc, The Arab Uprising. The Unfinished Revolutions of the 
New Middle East, (New York, Public Affairs, 2013) 
48 Hanieh 2013, p. 164 
49 Kandil 2014, p. 253 
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Under Mubarak“. According to Kandil, Mubarak provided some privileges to the army in 
order to keep control over the institution and, meanwhile, he ensured a certain security to his 
regime fostering the police and the Egyptian intelligence. Kandil rightly mentions “After 
Mubarak was deposed, a Financial Times commentator confessed that the army’s “reputed 
economic ‘empire’… is considerably more modest in volume than is commonly believed, 
and has probably shrunk in proportion to a national economy that has grown by more than 3 
percent annually since 2003…[and] although a few generals are rumored to have become 
rich, the main purpose [behind the military’s economic activities]…is to ameliorate the 
impact of a rapidly privatizing economy on the living standards of officers“50.  
To sum up, the military’s activity covered the necessities without really generating a 
noteworthy surplus. The main Kandil’s assumption is the army was intrinsically tied with 
the [geopolitical] alliances decided under Sadat. Gradually the army could not bear its new 
political role and it led the dignitaries to defect with the Mubarak regime when the 2011 
uprising blew up, getting the key role of the arbitrator51. Skocpol tackles the topic of the 
army in the social revolution. Surprisingly, the first connection that stroke me most was with 
the 1905 Russian Revolution when she says “what accounts for the failure of the Revolution 
of 1905 was the Czarist regime’s ability to rely upon the army to repress popular 
disturbances. Skillful tactics were involved: the regime bought time to organize repression 
and assure military loyalty with well-timed liberal concessions (…)52.“ The connection with 
Egypt is obvious insofar as the Egyptian army did not topple Mubarak because they got 
guarantees from his regime. However, when the regime started to be threatened [in Suez 
and, subsequently, in Cairo] the army had to make a choice: whether they save the regime 
and the privileges they got along the past decades (but without a leading role on the political 
scene) or a defection with Mubarak regime, that is, a conservation of its privileges and a 
leading role, meaning that the military decide what are the most desirable alternative forces 
for Egypt and for them.  
At the end, they made the second choice with a large popular support. They refused 
to shoot the demonstrators and by doing so, they grabbed a significant sympathy of public 
opinion. Some could say they just stood by passively, yet, on purpose. For the demonstrators 
in Suez and elsewhere, the main popular enemy was not the army but the police forces, as I 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 Ibid, 183 
51 A role they confirmed with the 3 July, 2013 ‘Coup‘ and el-Sisi’s nomination as the Head of State 
52 Skocpol 1994, p. 141	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shall explain through the second chapter. The police forces were indeed found guilty of 
literally shameful abuses that boosted Suez’s inhabitants’ outcry53.  
 However, should we really talk about fraternizations between the demonstrators and 
the army? This question requires cautiousness. As a matter of fact, taking into account all 
the events that occurred in the 2011 uprising, not at the onset. Seemingly, the soldiers just 
received the order not to intervene. In other words, the Egyptian staff decided to use the 
strategy ‘Wait and see’ while the police forces quelled brutally the demonstrators in Suez 
and, then in Cairo. The general staff gave orders to stay by passively. Nevertheless, a 
recurring clear demand was expressed in Suez all along the 2011 uprising: “Down with the 
military rule!“ which means that a very convulated relationship existed between the 
protesters and the military54. The aforementioned relationship is even more complicated 
since el-Sisi decided to crush the last protestors so that to bring order back in the area. The 
military power seems to be well decided to put an end to the perennial chaos in Suez by a 
fierce repression. But also by promising a social improvement through the construction of 
the New Suez Canal that would grant a lot of jobs to the local population of a marginalized 
area.  
Thereafter, when the army noticed that Mubarak was about to be toppled, the 
generals knew that power was about to fall in their hands like a ‘ripe piece of fruit’. Therein, 
the army was a significant factor of the 2011 uprising as it was in many other social 
revolutions. It seems necessary to underscore the complicated relationships between the 
army and the city of Suez. As a matter of fact, for a certain time, Suez had a significant 
sympathy for the army, merely due to the city’s location at the frontline of the war against 
the Israeli archenemy. The most meaningful example is when the Defence Minister under 
Sadat - Ahmed Badawy (1927-1981) - enjoyed considerable popularity after defending 
famously Suez against an imminent Israeli invasion in 197355. He was renowned as a war 
hero for having protected the city. 
 However, the army faded, as in the rest of the country for the benefit of the police 
forces, much more loyal to the regime. As Skocpol identifies, there is a combination of 
structural conditions conducive to social revolutions and as in France and China likewise, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
53 Kouddous, Sharif Abdel, 13 December, 2011, “Egtpt Heads to the Polls, Round II,“ Pulitzer Center on 
Crisis Reporting, http://pulitzercenter.org/reporting/egypt-suez-parliamentary-elections-vote-citizens-military-
protest-clashes 
54 Ibid. 
55 Kandil 2014, p. 145 
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“Administrative and military breakdowns of old-regime states [are] one major condition for 
the occurrence of social revolution“56.  
However, that failure from administrative and military bodies are not enough to 
trigger social revolutions since local socioeconomic and political conditions matter. Here is 
the scrutiny that I intend to do concerning Suez since my assessment is that the local 
socioeconomic aspects in Suez were paramount for the 2011 uprising. However, the army 
also played a role in the 2011 uprising. Indeed, in late 2010, many Suezi people complained 
their city became “military garrison“57. However, what really decided Cairo to place Suez in 
high alert was not the assassination of a military but a high-ranking police general. It leads 
me to think that police forces were the true enemy for the overwhelming part of the Suez 
population. I will explore this approach through the third chapter. 
In sum, I intend to tackle many aspects of Suez’s idiosyncrasy because the literature 
is dense, the data combine history, politics, geopolitics, social policy and economics. In 
addition, obviously, I shall need to use specific concepts elaborated by social-theorists. I 
shall do so through the first chapter. As a matter of fact, it is necessary to delve culture 
idioms, notions such as resistance, revolution and social revolutions in order to grasp what is 
at stake in the seaport city of Suez. Last but not least, I could highlight the fact that, beyond 
a certain point,  a peculiar pattern of social revolution exists in Suez.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 Skocpol 1994, p. 5 
57 El-Ghobashy, Mona, “The Praxis of the Egyptian Revolution,“Middle East Research and Information 
Project, published in MER 258, accessed on 2 July, 2015, http://www.merip.org/mer/mer258/praxis-egyptian-
revolution 
	   19	  
Chapter 1: Resistance, culture, Suez, and the culture of resistance. 
 
“The masses go into a revolution not with a prepared plan of social reconstruction but with 
a sharp feeling that they cannot endure the old regime.“  
Leo Trotsky58. 
 
a. What is resistance? 
 
As said above, this part requires to introduce a certain theoretical framework based 
on the concepts elaborated by social-theorists, in order to define what is really at stake in 
Suez. Resistance is intrinsically tied with revolution and notions as contention, protest or 
power struggle. As such, I intend to elaborate a definition of resistance based on the research 
work of social-theorists.   
For many reasons, there is a myriad of definitions of resistance, and Resistance 
studies are largely linked to Social Movements studies, Terrorism studies and Subaltern 
Studies. As Foucault underscores through The Order of Discourse, power is always a matter 
of subordinate positions59. Hence, resistance is the kind of actions which dissolves, 
undermines, questions or challenges such subordination, and, ultimately, produce somehow 
‘non-subordinate relations’. Indeed, resistance demands a subaltern or subordinate position 
in relation to power. Therein, it comes from below –as Skocpol points out60- but it is not 
fundamentally or even necessarily “good“.   
This research intends to scrutinize all the conceptions of resistance. Doing so, I listed 
three definitions that I consider rather linked to Suez either way. Suez’s resistance against 
foreign invaders may be seen through Moore’eyes when he says that resistance is “any 
activity designed to thwart [the invader’s plans], or perceived by the occupiers as working 
against their interests“61. This simple definition seems to illustrate what was the attitude of 
Suezi people whether in 1956 during the Suez Canal War or the Arab-Israeli War in 1967 
and especially in 1973. Yet, as I hypothesize, there was a reversal from a nationalist culture 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58 Skocpol 1994, p. 107 59	  Stoddart, C. J., Mark, “Ideology, Hegemony, Discourse: A critical Review of Theories of Knowledge and 
Power,“ 203-204, Social thoughts & Research, vol. 28, University of British Columbia, accessed on March 2, 
2015, 
https://www.academia.edu/3056903/Ideology_hegemony_discourse_A_critical_review_of_theories_of_knowl
edge_and_power 
60 Skocpol 1994, p. 8 
61 Moore, Bob, Resistance in Western Europe, (Bloomsbury Academic, 2000), 2 
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of resistance to a social culture of resistance. It therefore implies a different approach of 
resistance itself. Therein, I paid attention to Routledge’s definition of resistance as “any 
action imbued that attempts to challenge, change or retain particular circumstances relating 
to societal relations, processes and/or institutions [which] imply some form of contestation 
[and] cannot be separated from practices of domination“62. This definition is relatively 
noteworthy insofar as it provides a clear insight of what may be the springs of the resistance 
concept, animating Suez’s inhabitants. However, the best definition that I listed through my 
research to qualify the nature of Suez’s culture of resistance remains by far the one 
elaborated by Vinthagen and Lilja. It provides a short and clear depiction of what really 
embodies resistance in the renowned Egyptian seaport nowadays: “[resistance is] a subaltern 
response to power, a practice that challenges and which might undermine power“63. 
 Thus, I elaborated what I meant with the term ‘resistance’, condition sine qua non to 
make headway into my scrutiny. However, my hypothesis is that Suez’s inhabitants are 
animated by a ‘culture of resistance’. This means that I must briefly elaborate what I mean 
by ‘culture’, in order to respect the concepts forged by social-theorists and, therefore, to link 
them with my subject of study. 
 
b. What does a culture encompass ?  
 
Providing a definition of ‘culture’ is not as easy as it seems, but all along my 
research, Clyde Kluckhohn was very helpful in this regard. He shaped a first definition in 
1945 by saying “By culture we mean all those historically designs for living, explicit and 
implicit rational, and nonrational, which exist at any given time as potential guides for the 
behavior of men“64. The definition is very relevant and directly linked with my topic insofar, 
as it puts forward the overriding importance of history in the shared feeling of Suezi people 
regarding resistance. As said above, war is a key aspect of the culture of resistance forged 
through decades.  
But Kluckhohn went even further in 1952 by producing a sharper and more accurate 
definition: “Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 Routledge, Paul, The Imagineering of Resistance : Pollok Free State and the Practice of Postmodern 
Politics, 2, (Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers, 1997), 361 
63  Vinthagen, Stellan, “Understanding “Resistance“ : Exploring definitions, perspectives, forms and 
implications,“ School of Global Studies (Gothenburg University, Sweden, 2007), 4 
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and transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievements of human groups, 
including their embodiements in artifacts ; the essential core of culture consists of traditional 
(i.e. historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values, culture 
systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, and on the other as 
conditioning elements of further action“65 . This definition matches accurately to my 
assessment, in the extent that it summarizes the culture of resistance that existed in Suez 
during the Arab-Israeli Wars (in 1967 and above all in 1973). But also the one that emerged 
from the aforementioned ‘reversal’ in my hypothesis, that is from a nationalist culture of 
resistance to a social culture of resistance. As Skocpol said, “the replacement of one socio-
ideological order by another becomes a crucial dimension of the change that needs to be 
explained for any given revolution“66.  
In fact, culture means the learned and shared behavior of a community of connected 
human beings. Nevertheless, a culture lives because it is understood by the others and not 
because it is a legacy to defend67. 
 
c. The culture of resistance: a duty to resist against the odds. 
 
Hence the common feeling of people in Suez may be summarized by Gustave 
Flaubert’s statement : “Of all politics I understand only one thing: the revolt“68. Yet, some 
scholars –such as Skocpol- objects to the assumption that some places and not others are 
more likely to trigger intentionally revolutionary processes69. According to Skocpol, “class 
structures and conflicts are not the only basic “structural“ keys to revolutionary causes or 
outcomes“70. Instead, analysts need to focus more on the international relationships of old-
regime rulers and revolutionary state-builders to dominant and subordinate class. On the one 
hand, she advocates for an overview of the situation, and not a vision of local analysis. On 
the other hand, she advocates that ideology – and not culture- is constitutive of social 
order71. And if society is understood as ideologically constituted, then it is not enough to 	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treat ideology as a possible causal factor, explaining some portion of the change wrought by 
revolution72. However, I disagree with Skocpol’s assessment concerning Suez and its 
inhabitants, even though no wonder that is applicable in other contexts in different areas. 
First, as I said, a culture exists because the group of people concerned are self-aware 
of their own culture i.e. the people want to support their culture, to achieve something 
noteworthy in order to transmit the culture to their children as their parents did. All through 
the testimonies73 and the data that I was able to gather on the matter, I heard the same 
refrain, that is “Resistance is part of our culture !“74. This shows that whatever the social 
classes (provided they suffer abuses of the dictatorship) there is an overwhelming collective 
feeling of duty to resist.  
 
d. Some clues regarding a culture of resistance in Suez 
 
A culture exists because it is recognized by others. When the 2011 uprisings broke 
out in January 2011, Suez’s anthem was sang on Tahrir Square by the protesters75, that is, at 
the very onset of the revolution. Is it a common thing to hear the anthem of a seaport city at 
the very beginning of an episode which is an upheaval for Egypt’s history? It does not seem 
to be. This means that the culture of resistance in Suez is clearly recognized amongst 
Egyptians. Suez triggers the resistance thrust. In other words, if Suez rises up, all the nation 
must do so, as the essential is at stake, just as during the Arab-Israeli wars.  
In addition, even now, while the revolutionary spirit founders, it still prevails in Suez 
–above all through a group of few hundreds people calling themselves the Afareet (“the 
Ghosts“76) acting in the very heart of Suez. They are used to gather and chant against the 
Interior Ministry and military rule. All this happens whereas, in the meantime, there are 
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sprinkled protests in other parts of Egypt77.  My assessment is that the Afareet are not solely 
an anecdote but rather a cultural embodiment proper to Suez. They seem to express and 
show something peculiar to Suez's inhabitants: The feeling that they must resist for Egypt's 
sake. Otherwise, nobody would do so. Nevertheless, as Skocpol underscores, ideology is 
constitutive to a social order78. Somehow, a certain ideology entailed the culture of 
resistance. 
Furthermore, the figure of President Gamal Abdel Nasser remains very important in 
the collective representation in Egypt. Either way, the ideology that sparked off the whole 
common duty to resist for the people in Suez may be found in Nasser’s work about the 
revolutions Falsafat al-Thawrah (‘Philosophy of the Revolution’). In this book, he argued 
that “the revolution is a popular progressive struggle not class struggle [that brought] 
together peasants, workers, soldiers, intellectuals and national capital [as an alternative to] 
the alliance of exploitative capital and feudelism“79. This was proved in 1956, in 1967, and 
again in 1973. And the Nasserian precepts have been the idealistic motor of the January 
2011 uprising, seemingly still alive nowadays. It still boosts the need to stand up against 
abuses, corruption, social tenuousness and injustice. 
Finally, I could conclude this part by a quote that may illustrate the relationship 
between Suez and the central power of Cairo80, above all at the very end of Mubarak’s reign: 
“If relations of power are dispersed and fragmented throughout the social field, so must 
resistance to power be“81.  
In the next chapter, I shall delve the concrete reasons of the culture of resistance in 
Suez. I will pay a significant attention to history throughout the three recent wars that 
involved Suez’s inhabitants, their aftermath, and the social situation before Mubarak’s fall. I 
will also shed light on it by trying to present evidence of the –shameful- abuses that 
Mubarak regime let do, in highlighting briefly the case of Suez in comparison with other 
similar cities in Egypt. 
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Chapter 2 : The spirit of Suez. 
 
 
“[The canal] enables the nations of Asia and Europe to carry on the commerce that 
is essential if these countries are to maintain well-rounded and prosperous economies. [The 
Middle East is] a gateway between Eurasia and Africa…with about two thirds of the 
presently known oil deposits of the world. The nations of Europe are peculiarly dependent 
upon this supply, and this dependency relates to transportation as well as to production.“ 
President Einsenhower82 
 
a. Suez and the colonial greediness: the 1956 Tripartite Aggression. 
 
As I previously said, history is by far a significant aspect of Suez’s specificity. The 
seaport city is a key place by dint of its location. It is one of the two gates of one of the most 
important canals in the world – with Panama Canal - and an essential waterway for world 
trade. For this reason, Suez has always been a key city to capture for Egypt’s foreign 
enemies. Sure enough, firstly, it means control over half the Canal Zone (the other gate is in 
Port Said, and Ismailia is the equidistant city from the two canal gates). Secondly, since 
Suez is the capital of the governorate of the same name, it implies putting under control one 
of the largest governorates of Northern Egypt. Finally, it means opening the road to Cairo, 
the Egyptian capital. 
Egypt faced three invasions of its territory during the post-World War II period. The 
first invasion happened in October 1956. That war, which is known in historiography as 
Suez Crisis or The Tripartite Aggression, was a common-led intervention that involved 
Britain, France and Israel. The goal was threefold. First, it was to get back Anglo-French 
control over the Suez Canal. As a matter of fact, President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who 
toppled the Egyptian king Faruk –known for his complacency vis-à-vis British colonialism- 
and drew up an anticolonial nationalist ideology, decided to nationalize the Suez Canal on 
July 30, 1956. This decision was unbearable for the two major colonial powers, as it was 
perceived as a provocation. The other goal of the intervention was to get rid of Gamal Abdel 
Nasser83. Doing so, France and Britain needed a local support in the area. Thereby, as part of 
the secret protocol of Sèvres84, in Paris’ suburb, France and Britain concluded an alliance 	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with Israel. The last goal of the tripartite plot was to afford the young Hebrew State to strike 
first into Sinai, so that to get control back over the Strait of Tiran and dismantle the Egyptian 
military arsenal delivered by the Soviets85. 
The common-led strikes against Egypt concerned three invaders: two of the most 
industriaized powers in the world and a direct neighbor, well-equipped from a militarily 
point of view. For many, Nasser triggered that war because “for months the president had 
been looking for a pretext to reclaim Egypt’s rights over the Suez Canal. […] Citing the 
need to channel the canal’s revenue toward financing the [Aswan] dam, a defiant Nasser 
nationalized the Suez Canal in front of an ecstatic crowd on July 26, 1956“86. There is a 
great example of what was really the Nasserist resistance during the Suez War87 i.e. a story 
that may embody the overwhelming feeling in Suez during this key event in modern 
Egyptian history. “When Nasser got to GHQ [General Headquarter] on October 31, he was 
advised to surrender himself to the British to spare the country from total destruction. 
Amer88, who was apparently suffering from a nervous breakdown, cried: ‘The air strikes will 
send the country back a thousand years. I cannot expose my countrymen to such a 
massacre !’. And Nasser harshly responded to Amer’s pleas for submission: ‘Nobody is 
going to surrender; everybody is going to fight…your behavior is unmanly; the first shots 
have hardly been fired. Not only must I take direct command of the army, but I also don’t 
want you issuing any orders…If you can’t do better than mope like an old hag then you will 
be court-martialed!’“. This story recounted by Aburish89 is quite in line with Nasser’s 
precepts, elaborated throughout Falsafat al-thawrah [‘Philosophy of the Revolution’] 
quoted above.  
All the society must fight against invaders at any cost in the name of Motherland. 
There is no exception. Some critic analysts might compare this philosophy to Levée en 
masse (“mass uprising“, or “mass mobilization“), in reference to the term used for mass 
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conscription during the French Revolutionary Wars or the Volkssturm90- the German 
national militia during the last months of WWII91.  
Suez was never captured during this war but a strong popular resistance was 
organized under the supervision of Zakariyyā Muhyi al-Dīn (1918-2012), one of Nasser’s 
henchmen, who paid special attention in organizing resistance in the canal cities92. Although 
Egypt was soundly defeated by the striking force of the two colonial powers and their Israeli 
ally, it is undoubtedly a political triumph for Nasser. “The president displayed great agility 
in mobilizing popular resistance and securing diplomatic support out of all proportion to his 
country’s strength. His arousing speeches and confident attitude inspired Egyptians to resist 
fiercely, and the stories of their heroic defiance are still part of the folklore of the citizens of 
the canal cities“93.  
Yet, it is certainly much more than a folklore in Suez, but genuinely a part of Suez’s 
inhabitants culture. The Suez War is a milestone for Egypt and, at a lower scale, for Suez as 
it laid the groundwork for a powerful and transgenerational ideology to resist the oppressor. 
Even Hanieh supports my standpoint when he says “The overthrow of colonially backed 
monarchies, the nationalization of the Suez Canal, and the later confrontations around Israel 
are potent indications (…). All these points of resistance generated widespread sympathy 
and deep-seated feelings of pride among all layers of Arab society. Millions of people hold a 
genuine nostalgia for this era that remains indelibly inscribed in political and cultural 
practices to the present day“94.  
However, I do not intend to explore further Nasserism but I deem that it provides 
great clues in understanding the spirit of resistance in Suez. Resistance did not provide 
victory to Egypt during this war but diplomatic action with the two superpowers of that time 
i.e. the Soviet Union and the United States. Nasser is a revolutionary who got rid of colonial 
control over his country. The Egyptian people, boosted by nationalist pride, were logically 
ready to fight for a nationalist cause –in this case, the invasion of their country. As Skocpol 
says “the various international contexts in which third-world revolutions have occurred 
become crucial in conditioning the new regimes that have emerged from them. One basic 
aspect of the international situation is the relationship between a country undergoing 	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revolution and the great powers, whatever they may be in a given phase of world history. 
Military, economic and cultural aspects of such relations all need to be considered“95. The 
geopolitical context of this crisis is overriding to take into account: for the first time, 
Egyptian people humiliated their oppressors, that is to say the colonial powers. The memory 
is still vivid in Suez for obvious reasons: Suez suffered two other wars against Israel, against 
another oppressor. I will end this subpart by quoting Skocpol, who very rightly says “we can 
expect aspirations for equality and dignity, both within nations and on the international 
stage, to flow again and again into military mass mobilization. Arguably, this is the mission 
that revolutionized regimes perform best. In the face of serious (but not overwhelming) 
foreign threats, they excel at motivating the formerly excluded to die for the glory of their 
national states“96. 
 
b. Nationalism, Nasserism and the Six-Day War: Suez and the great disaster. 
 
Actually, the Tripartite Aggression gave credit to the Nasserist revolution amongst 
the population, as it undoubtedly was a political victory. Yet, even though this project does 
not intend to delve Nasserism per se, a political game proper to that time is worth to mention 
because one cannot simply explain the past and current culture of resistance in Suez by 
Nasserism. It is solely an explanation. Egypt was not politically united behind President 
Nasser, and fierce struggles occurred at that time in the sense that “the 1950s and 1960s 
were characterized by sharp confrontations with the Left, independent worker movements, 
and other struggles. These movements were tolerated at points, and their discourses were 
often absorbed into language of ruling regimes (as can be seen in the frequent refrain of 
‘Arab socialism’), but all Arab nationalist movements aimed at demobilizing and 
persecuting any left-wing forces that attempted to strengthen the autonomous mobilization 
of workers and other social forces“97 .  
I believe that it confirms my assessment that a nationalist culture of resistance was 
animating the population and not a social culture of resistance, specifically in the canal cities 
and above all in Suez. Nasser was a great figure who succeeded by using political weapons 
at the expense of military ones to achieve glorious victory. Thus, despite political infighting 
within the Egyptian society, Nasser enjoyed nearly blind support from Egyptian civil 	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society. His victory against the colonial powers paved the way to another war, i.e. the 1967 
Six-Day War against Egypt’s archenemy: Israel. That war was much less victorious and 
Suez was at the frontline.  
Actually, it was a terrible disaster for Egypt and its Arab allies. The war took place 
between June 5 and 10, 1967 and destroyed most of the Egyptian airforce. At the onset of 
that war, the Egyptian government decided to close the Suez Canal, besides fifteen cargo 
ships were trapped inside98 for the whole closure of the canal, until 1975. After the war, 
Israeli troops were on one side of the canal and Egyptian troops on the other.  
 
c. The forced migration. 
 
A little-known consequence of that war occurred amidst the Israeli victory: the forced 
migration. Following the occupation of Egypt’s Sinai peninsula, the Egyptian sovereignty 
was transiently suspended on the Suez Canal and the three governorates on its west bank99. 
The three canal cities were evacuated and over 60 percent of their residents were compelled 
to leave in other parts of the country. Indicatively, the total number of forced migrants is 
around 750,000 people100. In Suez, in 1960, there were around 120,000 inhabitants101. It 
means that around 72,000 Suezi residents were forced to leave their city. Many migrants 
settled in Sharqyya governorate, the nearest of the Canal Zone. Zagazig, the capital of the 
aforestated governorate, absorbed 56,000 migrants of the canal area itself, which means 6 or 
7 percent of all the migrants. For all these years, between the 1967 defeat and the next Arab-
Israeli war of 1973, there were many skirmiches between Egyptian soldiers and especially 
between the remaining inhabitants of Suez organized as a kind of militia102 and the IDF103.  
The 1967 defeat of Egypt and its allies is the biggest disaster after the defeat of the 
1948 Palestine War. Somehow, a new ‘Nakba‘104. However, for most of the residents of 	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Suez, the trauma is much more important as they had to leave their homes and their city. A 
deep and legitimate desire of revenge against Israel grew significantly, amongst those who 
were forced to leave. They were chewing that daily humiliation until the next war. Through 
an interview I conducted in Egypt, an elderly who lived that exodus told me “We were 
living the same fate as the Palestinians because of the same oppressor!“105.  
All of this to say that that backlash of the Six-Day War significantly boosted the 
already-existing culture of resistance in Suez. Politically speaking, Israel’s victory entailed a 
decisive turning point in the evolution of Arab nationalism, meaning that Israel’s victory 
triggered a disastrous “blow to the notions of Arab unity and resistance that had crystallized 
most sharply in Nasser’s Egypt. The military defeat was symbolically reinforced by Nasser’s 
death in 1970 and the coming to power of Anwar Sadat (1918-1981), who subsequently 
moved to reverse many of Nasser’s more radical policies“106.  
Furthermore, that dire episode of Suez’s history taught many things to Suez’s 
inhabitants. Among others, they could not expect miracles from the Nasserist revolutionary 
governement in Cairo. One may assume the frustration and the desillusion they felt. The 
elderly that I interviewed (quoted above) even told me “We expected a response from 
Nasser because we could not imagine that he would abandon us like that. But nothing 
happened. We had to find a way by ourselves.“107 As such, “[…]structural transformations 
of states have provided the opportunities and provocations for a large proportion of violent 
political conflicts; that agents of the state are the most active perpetrators of violence; and 
that “war bears a crucial relationship to revolution“ both through its impact upon coercive 
capacities and through its effect on governmental demands upon subject populations108. But 
on the other hand, [Tilly’s stress upon] multiple sovereignty as the defining characteristic of 
revolution trivializes – inadvertently, no doubt –role of the state. The state is not seen as 
determining by its own strength or weakness whether or not a revolutionary situation can 
emerge at all. Instead it is portrayed as an organization competing for popular support on 
more or less equal terms with one or more fully formed revolutionary organizations or blocs. 
Societal members are envisaged as able to choose freely and deliberately whether to support 
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the government or a revolutionary organization, with their choices determining whether or 
not a revolutionary situation develops“109. 
 
d. The Yom Kippur War: Suez’s acclaim amidst another disaster for Egypt.  
 
 In 1973, following the War of Attrition110 (characterized by many skirmiches 
between Egyptian and Israeli armies on a Cold War background), Egypt’s situation was 
disastrous. The country was still trying to recover from a defeat with dire consequences, that 
is, the destruction of its airforce (among others), a significant swath of its territory was 
occupied by a foreign power. The Canal’s closure entailed the loss of one-third of Egypt’s 
annual incomes111. Nasser was dead (in 1971) and the Nasserist Arab revolutionary spirit 
came up violently against the Israeli bulldozer. Egypt - also called Umm el Dunya112 (“The 
Mother of the World“) – which was a great hope for the whole Arab World was humiliated. 
And to top it all, many of its citizens were forced to leave their homes. Obviously, a revenge 
was to be anticipated so that to take back the Suez Canal, Sinai and to show Israel that 
Egyptians “could jeopardize its security“113. In this context, Anwar Sadat became Nasser’s 
successor and the supreme leader of Egypt.  
As said above, the Canal was the cease fire line114 and naturally, in case of a new 
war, the canal cities would be at the frontline because the Egyptians will have to cross the 
Canal at the outbreak of hostilities. Or rather to resume the hostilities. This is why Sadat met 
the troops stationed in Suez on May 12, 1971, to make sure they were ready to fight when he 
gives the order to attack115. The war took place from October 6 to 25, 1973. I shall not 
elaborate all the unfolding of this war. Instead I shall pay attention to a noteworthy event 
that concerns Suez: what is remebered as the Battle of Suez.  
The battle took place at the very end of the war on October 24-25, 1973. A cease fire 
was decided under the patronage of the United Nations (U.N.). But the Israelis wanted to 	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capture Suez, in order to surrounder a symbolic city presumed to hold supplies of the Third 
Egyptian Army. Whilst Port Said and several Delta cities were bombed by Israeli fighters116, 
Suez was relatively spared. The IDF wanted to capture Suez before the looming arrival of 
the U.N. observers to the front. The Israeli staff assumed that Suez was hardly defended 
because they made sure the city was isolated from the rest of the country.  
As said above, a militia of 5,000 men compounded the town’s defense force117. 
Therefore, the IDF started to asphyxiate the city by cutting off all the sources of oil, fresh 
water and electricity. Nonetheless, after a certain hesitation because they did not know the 
capacity of the defense forces, they chose to enter the city. The Israelis assumed Suez would 
not resist. Indeed, most Egyptian soldiers surrendered for the past few days. Subsequently, a 
series of very fierce urban fights took place. The Israeli forces were literally ambushed and 
suffered heavy fire from all sides. They simply did not know where they came from. Ahmed 
Badawy (1927-1981), who would later become Egypt’s Defense Minister, is famous for 
having organized the resistance against the Israeli invasion of Suez118. The 5,000 men who 
defended the city with small arms and assault rifles managed a real military exploit. They 
destroyed several Israeli tanks and trapped a whole company in the building of Arba’een 
Police Station119.  
All in all, 80 Israeli soldiers were killed, 120 wounded120 and the whole company 
was compelled to run away from the city. The Israelis faced their first real defeat because 
they were compelled to retreat due to fighters who defended boldly and frantically their city. 
All this episode of Suez’s history leads to think like Mazzini: “Insurrection by means of 
guerilla bands is the true method of warfare for all nations desirous of emancipating 
themselves from a foreign yoke. It is invincible, indestructible“121.  
Suez was in ruins, but the residents got a tremendous prestige all around the country. 
They did not surrender and they resisted against the ‘Invincible Enemy‘. Even the Israelis 
“admitted how fierce the resistance was“122 by comparing the battle of Suez to the Battle of 
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Stalingrad123. The cease fire took effect and one of the conditions for the peace agreement, 
negociated between Kissinger124 and Sadat, was that “the Suez Canal would never be closed 
to Israeli navigation [and] the Suez Canal cities would be rebuilt, expanded, and heavily 
populated as a guarantee against the eruption of future conflicts“125 . As regards Suez and its 
residents, it is really the apex of the rising culture of resistance by dint of the bravery they 
showed. The fighters of Suez saved the honor of the whole country. This episode was each 
time mentioned in all the documentaries and movies about Suez. My interviewees also 
mentioned this great moment of Suez’s history, meaning that the Battle of Suez is a great 
example of resistance for the whole Egyptian popular culture. For Suez’s residents, it is 
certainly a key moment of their history, somewhat on the French model of the 14 July. 
 
e. Suez under Hosni Mubarak: corruption, impoverishment and police state. 
 
Yet, after this glorious moment in Suez’s history, Kandil so rightly called this period 
‘The Long Lull Before the Perfect Storm: Revolt in January 2011‘. Sure enough, Egypt 
faced significant economic problems. The 1973 war was a political success, but “was 
estimated to have cost $40 billion, and the general fiscal squeeze caused by rising food and 
energy imports led Sadat to seek loans from US and European lenders as well as regional 
zones of surplus capital such“126. The peace agreement signed on March 26, 1979, between 
Egypt and Israel, was largely the result of tough pressure of Washington and was not 
understood by the residents of Suez. While the city was slowly rebuilding, Sadat was 
assassinated on October 6, 1981 and  Hosni Mubarak succeeded him at the Head of Egypt. 
Slowly but surely, corruption and cronyism settled in Egypt, including in Suez, and the 
police was placed on a pedestal127 to give place to abuses. In fact, policemen began to act as 
thugs128. “The average Egyptian can be dragged into a police station and tortured simply 
because a police officer doesn’t like his face129 .[…] Torture in criminal cases was so brutal 
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that in several instances suspects admitted to murder (a crime punishable by death) only to 
discover afterward that their alleged ‘victims‘ were still alive“130.  
In 2008, Egyptian human rights organizations deplored 916 cases of police violence 
against nonpolitical citizens131. In Suez, known for being ‘The Bride of the Red Sea‘ by the 
Egyptians, the social infrastructures disappeared gradually to give place to organs of 
repression such as the sadly famous orphanage turned into a police station: Arba’een police 
station132. Under Mubarak, that place was a symbol of corruption, torture … and many 
nicknamed it ‘The Egyptian Abu Ghraib‘ in reference to the sorrowfully renowned Iraqi 
prison where U.S. soldiers committed shameful acts of torture and humiliation.  
As regards corruption and cronyism, the Egyptian capitalists-turned-politicians 
turned their back on the severe social problems of Egypt as poverty, unemployment, 
illiteracy, deteriorating public services, urban congestion, shantytowns and the like. They 
were not only richer, but also more demanding therein their business expansion required the 
state to deregulate the economy, privatize public companies, reduce subsidies for the poor 
and taxes for the rich, and allow them cheap access to public resources133. Hence Mubarak 
“allocated 67, 200 square kilometers (an area equivalent to the size of Palestine, Lebanon, 
Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain combined) worth £E 800 billion to favored investors. Mubarak’s 
cronies were appointed to the most important positions and they used to hire shamefully 
people from their own governorates instead of Suezi workers134. As an example illustrating 
the unheard corruption that took place in Suez under Mubarak, the case of Ahmed Ezz135 
seems emblematic. Ezz acquired 21 million square meters at the price of £E 4 per meter in 
the industrial area of the Gulf of Suez, only to resell it to foreign companies for £E 1, 000 
per meter a couple years later136. All that with the blessing of the ‘Rais’137.  
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Above all that, due to a promising project called the Kuraymat Project138, it seems 
that there are 80 percent more parasites in the water of Suez139. Yet, it is not very surprising 
in a country where 79 percent Egyptians have no access to clean drinking water and a proper 
sewage system140. “Consequently, the drinking water is foul-tasting and has many impurities 
resulting in intestinal and kidney diseases and cancers“141. Such terrible living-conditions 
merely feed a burgeoning outcry. 
To summarize what is the situation on the eve of the January 2011 uprising, here is a 
seaport city that proved its deep loyalty to the nation of Egypt. Its residents fought fiercely 
against foreign invaders. They even defeated a never-beaten foe, i.e. Israel, that threatened  
to capture their city. No other town or battalion succeeded to do so. In Suez, humiliation and 
fear changed sides due to resistance -some may say heroism. For this, the city got a 
tremendous prestige around Egypt and even beyond its borders.  
Yet, subsequently, Suez faced up dictatorship and its darkest aspects, that is to say, 
an obnoxious and intolerable corruption characterized by cronyism, mass unemployment –
especially among the young people142, a wild and fierce police repression epitomized by acts 
of torture and abuses, and miserable living conditions. Some residents in Suez even say 
“Suez is the only place where still-alive heroes live in cemeteries“143. In other words, Suez 
gradually became a tremendous shantytown while the port and the canal generated 
enormous incomes to the Egyptian economy. On November 29, 2010, a high-ranked police 
general was assassinated in Suez144 “in plain sight by a former informant, whose trial turned 
into an exposé of the gendarmerie’s brutal methods“145; then the match was ready to be lit to 
ignite the barrels of explosives. Regarding the Arab Spring, the revolution is “a set of 	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cultural and organizational forms thoroughly socially embedded in the urban communal 
enclaves that became the centers of popular resistance(…)“146. Suez is one these urban 
communal enclaves that became the centers of resistance. 
 
In the next chapter, I will elaborate the unfolding of the 2011 uprising in Suez and its 
aftermath. I intend to shed light on the struggles for the revolutionary leadership between 
religious movements and Leftist movements. Then, I shall mention the short Morsi’s 
presidency insofar as revolution has stepped up at that time. Finally, I shall scrutinize the 
current situation by analyzing both the still-ongoing protest movements and the construction 
of the new Suez Canal. Doing so, I intend to delve the impact of the project on the city of 
Suez and its residents. 
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Chapter 3: How does Suez face Egypt’s history. 
 
“(…) If the dam of autocracy is broken, a sea of angry people will flood the country“. 
Hazem Kandil147 
 
a. January 2011: Suez, source of the Egyptian revolutionary thrust. 
 
As said above, Suez is rather different from other Canal cities as many large factories 
and commercial activities are settled in the seaport city, unlike Isma‘iliyya and Port Said 
which are solely focused on the Canal traffic. There are five main districts in Suez148 and 
three main ports: Port Tawfik, Petroleum Dock, and Attaka Port149. Naturally, it led to a 
labor organizing and activism in the city, due to the cosmopolitan nature of the workforce. 
The 2011 Egyptian uprising took place on January 25, 2011. When the 
demonstrations were relatively peaceful in cities like Cairo or Alexandria, the demonstration 
in Suez was dramatically violent. The police shot three protestors and one of them died. He 
was a university student150. Thereafter, Qalyoubiyya and Suez were placed on high alert by 
Cairo151. After that, Suez became ‘The Flame of Revolution‘. Rage seized demonstrators for 
that murder, and they burnt up most of the police stations in the city. Above all, the 
aforementioned Arba’een Police Station was the main symbol to be burst. Arguably, the 
ultimate fault, i.e. the young student murder, finally convinced the demonstrators that the 
policemen were merely hoodlums that had to be fought. The movement became so 
important that the situation grew out of control. Beyond a certain point, the bloodiest 
confrontations took place in Suez. Even the Chief of Security Forces complained in an 
official memo that his men were “not prepared to meet the massive demonstrations because 
the State Security Investigations Sector152 reports were ‘not taken seriously’“153. It means 
that the Egyptian intelligence was aware that something was up in Suez, but Cairo 	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disregarded it. Hence, the security forces were outnumbered and for a while Suez was empty 
of police forces. However, Suez deserves its pride in being the epicenter of the revolution 
because when Tahrir Square in Cairo became genuinely the emblematic square of the 
revolution, many testimonies attest that the protesting crowd sung the anthem of Suez as a 
rallying song154. 
 
c. Resisting for a social improvement. 
 
Subsequently, the workers of Suez went on strikes155 in order to get a 40 percent 
wage increase and better working conditions156. Actually, unions existed under Mubarak –
Egyptian Trade Union Federation (ETUF) - but it was used by the regime as a political 
weapon to lull the workers157. A statement signed by many factories called for its dissolution 
as “one of the most important symbols of corruption under the defunct regime“158. 
Furthermore, the toppling of Mubarak did not satisfy the workers. Indeed, first the 
transitional military power refused the wage increase, and second, the strikers faced a surreal 
logic, that is their wages and labor conditions were set by parliamentary legislation. Yet, 
unfortunately since there was no Parliament, their conditions of employment could not be 
changed by the proper legal procedures159. A rather vicious way to block any kind of urgent 
social reform. 
The strikes expressed the workers’ objection to that logic and after Suez, Cairo, 
Alexandria, many other places went on strike to claim a basic social improvement such as in 
Damietta and other Canal cities160. Nevertheless, it is not the first time that Egypt faces a 
literal wave of strikes. Between 2001 and 2011, around 2 million workers participated in 	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strikes161. Even though, the regime used clientelism as a tool to alleviate the tensions, it is 
the first time that such a wave occurs as part of a revolution. In addition, when Mubarak 
dismissed, the military remained uncompromising and did not accept the protesters’ 
demands. Military power adamantly refused any type of reforms, while merely be granted 
basic social claims. 
 “Egypt had become a failed state in the eyes of its own people“162 says Kandil. 
Possibly in the rest of the country but in Suez the struggle continued. “The social unrest 
resulting from the shrinking of social benefits, the steady rise in price levels, the laying off 
of thousands of public – and private-sector workers, and the systematic and rabid corruption 
inflicting economic life required constant repression“163. The Supreme Council of the 
Armed Forces (SCAF) was determined to crush the revolutionary process by quelling the 
protest movement. Doing so, they encouraged a trend of diminishing returns on popular 
protests, with ever smaller numbers turning up and less consensus on the demands to be 
pressed. The SCAF could do it by spurring on that trend with a nasty media campaign 
designed to tarnish the nationalist credentials of key protest groups, to empahasize an 
alleged popular desire for a return to normalcy, and to fan class resentments against the 
protest movements164. Thereafter, the opinion rapidly turned against the protestors, as they 
disrupted traffic and their tent city inhibited local businesses165.  
 
d. The religious and Leftist movements in Suez: common resistance against the 
military rule. 
 
However, in Suez, all the social upheaval happened as part of a struggle between 
Leftist movements and religious groups i.e. Salafi groups and the Muslim Brotherhood 
(MB). The Suez Canal Zone has always been an area wherein religion is deeply implanted 
amongst the local population. For instance, Isma’illiyya is the birthplace of Hassan al-
Banna, founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, and the city remained for a long time the 
headquater of the MB. Yet, the Salafi movements had long stayed out of politics. But they 
rapidly organized into several political parties166 and jumped into the political realm. Both 	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religious movements had their assets to convince the local population. The MB was 
perceived as the main opposition force to Mubarak’s regime. They have been persecuted for 
decades, and went into hiding whilst they made charity actions with funds sent from allied 
countries (Qatar or Turkey inter alia). However, one of the main differences within their 
respective role in the revolution is that the MB played a key role in keeping the protests 
alive167, whereas the Salafi groups solely took advantage of the situation. They both 
advocate for the “Islamic“ choice. Nevertheless, everything is a matter of degree of political 
ambition concerning the aforestated choice. Just as the MB, the Salafi groups built their 
network. They had two popular television stations (financially supported by Saudi Arabia), 
well-known personalities, and a significant network of charitable institutions. Yet, 
mainstream Egyptians tended to find the Salafi groups more frightful than the Brotherhood. 
For example, their way of dressing168 marked them as alien within urban Egyptian society. 
Furthermore, their retrograde views on gender and on liberal values raised serious concerns 
(even amongst those who reconciled themselves to the Brotherhood’s place in Egyptian 
democracy169).  
In any case, both the MB and the Salafis tried to take advantage of the social 
tenuousness of the fringe of the most marginalized population, especially the youth. Sure 
enough, indicatively the unemployment reached 60 percent in Egypt from July 2007 to July 
2009 for people between 15 and 24170 (which presents evidence that it was largely a 
phenomenon of youth). Worse, 1, 11 million had fallen below the poverty line prior to the 
global crisis itself171. The religious movements were clearly determined to capitalize on 
pervasive poverty. In Suez, they certainly found a very fertile ground to do so.  
The other main opposition force in Suez was the Leftist movement, especially what 
is called the April 6 Youth Movement. The name of this political group is based on the 
violent strikes of April 6, 2008 in El-Mahalla El-Kubra, Northern Egypt. The organization 
was created in order to support the workers who decided to go on strike. The group is 
peculiarly active in Suez by organizing sit-ins in Maydan al-Arba’een square172 and has 
connections with the Afareets (mentioned above). Its critics accuse the organization to be a 
bourgeois liberal and idealistic group (somewhat on the model of the French students during 	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the May 1968 events). In fact, it is a mainly upper-middle class group but with an important 
ideological and mobilizational role for the workers. However, some militants may 
undermine the message of the organization by making literally eccentric and wacky 
demands like the independence of Suez and the management of the waterway173.  
Of course there are much other Leftist –or at least liberal- movements, such as the 
Nasserist groups, but they all splintered and they could not get any leadership. Nevertheless, 
the antagonism between religious movements and the liberal ones should be nuanced 
because, at the end, they are somehow allies –at least objective allies-  because they all want 
the end of the military rule174. Under Morsi, the MB was at power thus the onlookers could 
stare at weird demonstrations gathering Salafis and liberal groups while they are supposed to 
be diametrically opposed. Yet, they were pursuing the same immediate political goal. 
 
e. Suez and the new Suez Canal: a highly political project. 
 
When Morsi was overthrown and el-Sisi took power over, Cairo’s main goal 
regarding Suez was to bring order back while alleviating the social situation. In fact, el-Sisi 
faced a great challenge as regards the Suez Canal, and this challenge is largely connected to 
the culture of resistance in Suez. All along the revolution and its convulsions, the world 
trade did not stop and many ship cargoes continued to transit by the canal. The ships’ crews 
were puzzled witnesses of the chaos that occurred in the city. Gradually, some countries 
began to fear random protesters attacks on some of their cargoes. Egypt was unresponsive to 
the number of stable countries in the region (due to the social turmoils and the violence that 
took place). Consequently, some governments such as China’s sought an alternative to 
bypass the Suez Canal. That is how -in collaboration with the Israeli government- they 
elaborated a project called ‘Red-Med’ that would have been a high speed rail line connecting 
Eilat175 to Ashdod, Israel’s largest Mediterranean port176. All the project would have enabled 
Israel to leverage its alleged status as the most stable country in the Middle East. According 	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to the project, Israel was to built ship cargoes transit infrastructures through a railway freight 
connecting the Far East to Europe177. Even though the workers in Suez always said, over and 
over, they did not intend to attack any boat passing through the Canal178; it did not seem 
quite convincing. 
 When el-Sisi took over, he was determined to solve this problem as soon as possible. 
Indeed, such a project would have been a dreadful economical disaster for Egypt: the Canal 
is one of its main sources of revenue. Therein, he dedicated a significant part of his first 
speech at the General Assembly of the U.N. to the high expectations as regards the New 
Suez Canal. His discourse was rather clear and limpid: “[Egypt is] a state that is determined 
to achieve growth, prosperity and a promise in the future to the aspiration of its people. To 
achieve that, Egypt began implementing an ambitious comprehensive program to spur 
development till 2030 with the aim to lay the foundations of free market economy which is 
capable of attracting investments in a secure and stable environment. The new Suez Canal 
project (…) is a proof of the seriousness of our attempt and of the resolve the new Egypt to 
forge a better tomorrow for its children and youth“179. This is why, to reach a secure and 
stable environment, he committed to bring order back in Suez by quelling the demonstrators.  
This is why he committed to bring order back in Suez by quelling the demonstrators. He 
significantly increased repression in the city180. Yet, meanwhile he gave guarantees to the 
protesters by pledging that an alternative project was about to be launched that will create 
jobs and infrastructures. Hence President el-Sisi launched the construction of the new Suez 
Canal during a ceremony held on August 5th, 2014. The project is ambitious and is supposed 
to jump-start Egypt’s sagging economy. Sure enough, within a year181, Egypt is doubling the 
current canal with a 72 kilometers (44.7 miles) long new channel that will enable 97 ships 
per day (23 currently) to bypass the already-existing canal by 2023182.  
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Furthermore, the project is supposed to speed up the transit, that is, the ships will 
take only eleven hours to transit (down from eighteen)183. It will thoroughly reshape the 
whole Suez Canal Zone in the extent the project is expected to generate more than one 
million jobs184. The mega-project will definitely empower the region, marginalized hitherto. 
The project cost is significant: £E 60 billion185 i.e. $8 billion. To pay for, “the government 
decided to base the primary funding on investment certificates issued by the Suez Canal 
Authority to Egyptian nationals through Egyptian national banks. Annual interest up to 12% 
was added on the value of these certificates to encourage Egyptians to buy them“186.  
Yet, the project, remains arguable despite its ambition. First, it gives no solid 
guarantee in the extent that some experts are quite doubtful regarding its economic impact. 
The Suez Canal Authority projected the New Suez Canal will generate $13.2 billion per year 
by 2023 (up from $5.3 billion currently)187. However, some experts such as Omar al-
Shenety188 belie the enthusiasm of the Egyptian authorities by saying: “I cannot confirm that 
digging the new canal to increase [the canal’s] capacity, and thus allow the navigation of a 
larger number of vessels, will bring about a significant boom in the canal’s projected 
revenues“189. Therein, there are few chances this project –which was already on Mubarak’s 
and Morsi’s desk190- enables the achievement of the desired figures and revenues in view of 
doubling the number of vessels passing through the Suez Canal. Indeed, this is mainly 
linked to the global trade movement which increases by 2 or 3 Percent in regular periods191. 	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Finally, in spite of the strong media campaign that promises a radical change in 
Egypt, many residents of the Suez Canal Zone (i.e. including Suez) express their doubt, their 
fear or their opposition to this project192. Sure enough, as I noticed through my research and 
my journey in Egypt, many people in Cairo -and main cities such as Alexandria- support the 
project (because it appears as a wayout for Egypt’s economy) but in Suez, they fear the jobs 
will be granted to non-native people of Suez. In other words, the military government will 
send unemployed people from other parts of Egypt to get these promised jobs in order to 
decongest overcrowded cities like Cairo. However, the military power, embodied by el-Sisi, 
seems to be resolute and determined to go through with this project against the odds. At the 
end, the regime seems to be “provoking the revolutionaries in order to polarize them“193. 
The nearly ultimate goal is to annihilate any protest by tackling its source. To conclude on 
an optimistic note, one might say “every revolution has its counterrevolution –that is a sign 
the revolution is for real“194. Indeed, el-Sisi is said to be the “Egyptian Bonaparte“195 
meaning that he is a military who aims at bringing order back for the country’s sake and its 
economy, no matter whether he tramples the revolutionary ideals or not. Because this phase 
of counterrevolution fits precisely in a much wider and progressive revolutionary process in 
time196. 
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Conclusion 
 
“All of Suez people took part in the protest. Those who didn’t march in Al-Arbaeen 
Square helped by distributing masks to protect protesters from the gas. Others handed out 
soft drinks to people. It was an amazing scene of unity, a familiar one in Suez. We were all 
inspired by Ibrahim Suleiman who attacked the police station in 1973 to free it from Israeli 
occupation. This was an occupation too but the enemy was different. The israelis occupied 
our land, while this regime occupied our minds. We wanted to free our minds“  
Hussein Al-Shazly, a protester in Suez.197 
 
All through the scrutiny, I strived to shed light on the fact that Suezi people triggered 
something which is a milestone in Egypt’s history. They were the source of an 
unprecedented tidal wave in the country's history. They sparked off “an exceptionally rapid, 
intense, and nearly simultaneous explosion of popular protest“198. The mass protests of 
January 25, 2011 in Egypt were the “pivotal moment that transformed local domestic 
political struggles into a single, coherent, regional uprising“199. And all the uprising turned 
into a revolution in Suez because of the first protester killed by the police. As said above, the 
police forces behaved like merciless thugs, largely the source of a gradual hue and cry as 
regards Suez’s inhabitants. This could not last any longer after that revolting blunder. The 
young demonstrator killed embodies the match lighting the barrel of gasoline. The 
revolution bemoaned its first martyr.  
The renowned inclination of Suezi people to rise up, whether against a foreign 
invasion or an enemy of within i.e. the regime, is now explained by history. In addition, I 
tried to show the reversal that took place between the 1979 peace treaty agreement (between 
Egypt and the archenemy Israel) and the 2011 uprising. When there was a foreign enemy to 
fight, the living conditions were secondary because, at least, they were “free“ and not 
occupied. They were not forced to leave their households. In other words, the fight was the 
top priority for all of them. The spontaneous, unquestioning and formidable mobilization of 
the local population in Suez commanded respect and afforded a great victory amidst an 
endless series of defeats against the IDF. But when the Israeli foe was no longer a problem, 	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a slow and gradual reversal took place. Suez was undoubtedly famous for its capability to 
resist in any circumstances, even if the whole city was burning. Therefore, for having been 
capable of standing up against the Zionist enemy, the residents of Suez got a tremendous 
prestige. Suez was a synonym of resistance for everyone in Egypt. A culture of resistance 
was associated with the famous seaport city in the collective memory as a significant part of 
the city's inhabitants' identity.  
Yet, as the time and the dictatorship of Mubarak, the living conditions became the 
new top concern in Suez: no fresh water, no jobs, shameful corruption, police 
oppression…There was clearly quite a reversal from a nationalist culture of resistance to a 
social culture of resistance. In other words, “the message of these protests reverberated 
throughout the silent majority [of Egyptian society], revealing the fact that it was possible 
(…) to shake off fear of the regime“200. All the protest triggered in Suez entailed the 
overthrow of Mubarak, a president corrupt to the bone who ruled the country by an iron 
hand.  
Therein, the revolution was a success, but after the failed attempt of the Muslim 
Brotherhood to rule the country and the July 3, 2013 ‘coup’201, the military tookover. While 
the rest of the country seems jaded by all the political turmoils, Suez keeps on mobilizing a 
syncretism of political movements. Whether they are religious (Salafī, Muslim Brethren) or 
liberal (April 6 Youth Movement) so that to express their common desire not to give up the 
fight initiated in 2011202. Even though they do not pursue the same ultimate goal, their 
common aim is the end of the military rule, that is, a nationwide goal. This can be seen 
through the actions of the  aforementioned Afareet. Herein, Suez deserves the name of 
Flame of the Revolution, despite the great efforts made by el-Sisi’s government to transform 
this previously marginalized area through the New Suez Canal project. One more thing 
seems noteworthy: the resistance in Suez is and has aways been collective. There is not a 
figure that floats from the crowd. It is also an aspect of the idiosyncrasy of Suez. Although 
in three years, nothing seems to have really changed [in Suez], “the street has failed to 
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produce leaders; and the leaders have failed to adjust to the radical mood of the street“203. In 
addition, a foreign phobia grew lately in Suez for fear of spies. This can be explained by the 
foiled Israel attempt to take advantage of the chaotic situation in the area to spy activities 
related to the Canal204. As far as I am concerned, most of my contacts from Suez dissuaded 
me from going to Suez during my second stay in Egypt. I had to finish my interviews in 
Cairo. 
Yet, despite the reinforcement of the repression forces ordered by el-Sisi’s 
government to crush the protest in Suez once and for all, the struggle continues against the 
odds. And this relentlessness for the sake of values such as justice, democracy, freedom and 
dignity, which are not solely words, may lead anyone to think that while “for the moment 
the country remains divided; once again Suez may offer a window to offer what’s to 
come“205. Herein, Suez is animated by a national social culture of resistance that aims at 
mobilizing the whole Egyptian society for a better future. 
Eventually, the words of Martin Luther King Jr. seem to have resound amongst the 
people of Suez when he said magnificently “change does not roll in on the wheels of 
inevitability, but comes through continuous struggle. And so we must straighten our backs 
and work for our freedom. A man can’t ride you unless your back is bent“206. 
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Methodology review 
 
 
All through this project, I strived to provide a theoretical framework to my scrutiny. 
For instance, I paid a significant attention to the different terms and vocabulary that I used. 
Working on such a topic requires a certain discipline insofar as many social-theorists 
dedicated most of their careers to elaborate appropriate definitions that I had to deal with. It 
was necessary to use their work, in order to carry out a worthwhile analysis regarding the 
culture of resistance in Suez.  
Sure enough, as an evidence of my discipline concerning theory, I even devoted all 
the first part of my project to shed light on the complexity of theoretical matters connected 
to my topic. Subsequently, all through the two empirical chapters, I tried to combine facts, 
explanations and analysis while providing, again, a theoretical framework because a worthy 
academic work such as a thesis must be included within a structure.  
Thereby, as regards the paradigm, I adopted a deductive research approach because 
the whole ‘backbone‘ of my study is based on the process whereby the researcher expresses 
a theory, then a hypothesis. Hereafter, a data collection is done that entails findings. 
Therefore, I chose a quantitative research strategy because the principal orientation to the 
role of theory was deductive207. My study was based on testing theory by gathering data. In 
other words, history, findings, and analyses on facts were the essential tools to present 
evidence of my initial theory. At the end, the hypothesis was confirmed, that is, there is 
indeed a culture of resistance proper to Suez208. Doing so, it was necessary to incorporate the 
pratices and the norms of the natural scientific model as regards the epistemological 
orientation209. Moreover, it was overriding to pursue a certain objectivism regarding the 
ontological orientation of work. Indeed, I compelled me to analyze a view of social reality as 
an external, that is, while remaining objective. In addition, my work on Suez’s culture of 
resistance may be perceived as deductivism since “the purpose of theory is to generate 
hypotheses that can be tested and that will thereby allow explanations(…) to be assessed.“210 
As a matter of fact, given that the main hypothesis concerns the reversal between a 
nationalist culture of resistance to a social culture of resistance. I also worked with several 
newspapers articles in order to demonstrate the relevance and truthfulness of my 	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aforementioned hypothesis.  Meanwhile, I tried to diversify the origins of these sources 
because I deem articles are the best sources for such a matter regarding facts.  
Eventually, I incorporated excerpts of the interviews that I conducted in Egypt in 
September 2014. However, as I promised to the interviewees, I never mentioned any name 
on purpose. As a matter of fact, the only condition to accept to answer my questions was to 
grant anonymity to the interviewees through my work. However, I may say that I strived to 
diversify my interviewees’ profiles. For instance, one of them is a cost-controller in Suez for 
MAERSK company. Another is a taxi driver who was born in Suez and lived the Forced 
Migration in 1967, and another is a Suez native student who got involved in the 2011 
uprising. Thus I strived to get a range of diverse profiles, even though I wish I could have 
interviewed women from Suez because I would have been interested in knowing their 
perception of Suez’s culture of resistance.   
Eventually, I chose to end this scrutiny with a quotation from Martin Luther King 
because I thought Suez’s culture of resistance and the Afro-American community’s  may be 
an interesting correlation. 
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The Suez Canal in Suez, Egypt. November 2012. 
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